Who’s in Charge? New Study Exposes Chaos in UK Wildfire Policy
- Rob Beeson
- 34 minutes ago
- 6 min read
Wildfire is no longer a distant problem confined to California or Australia. In recent years, the UK has faced a sharp rise in fire incidents - from Saddleworth Moor and Winter Hill in 2018 to London’s record-breaking wildfires in 2022. As summers get hotter and drier, the question of who is responsible for preventing and managing these fires has become more urgent.
A new Master’s dissertation by Daisy Irwin (Northumbria University, 2025) explores this issue in depth. Her research investigates how well the UK’s wildfire system works - and where it’s failing.
Through interviews with professionals from the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS), government departments, landowners, academics and insurers, she reveals a system described by participants as “fragmented”, “reactive” and “underfunded.”
Jump to Section
A Growing Wildfire Threat
The UK’s wildfire season is lengthening. According to the National Fire Chiefs Council, fires are now starting earlier, burning for longer and spreading to new areas.
In 2022, more than 24,000 wildfires were recorded in just three summer months - a 663% increase on the previous year. The London Fire Brigade called it their busiest day since the Second World War.
Wildfire is now formally listed on the government’s National Risk Register, yet it is still rated as a low-likelihood, moderate-impact event - a classification that underestimates the true cost.
Research from the Moorland Association this year estimated that wildfires in 2025 had already cost over £460 million, twelve times higher than government projections.
What the Research Looked At
Irwin’s study focused on three main questions:
How do different organisations and individuals understand their responsibilities in wildfire prevention, response and recovery?
How effective is the current structure of wildfire governance?
What improvements are needed to strengthen resilience?
Ten participants took part, representing key stakeholder groups including the FRS, landowners, government officials, researchers and environmental organisations. The findings were analysed thematically, producing a detailed map of how wildfire responsibilities are spread - and where coordination breaks down.
Fragmented Governance and Blurred Responsibility
A major theme running through the study is confusion over who is responsible for what.
Wildfire management in the UK is spread across multiple departments and agencies. The Home Office oversees the Fire and Rescue Service, while the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) leads on land management and environmental policy. These silos create a lack of coordination and slow decision-making.
One participant described the system as a “fragmented chain,” where information and resources fail to move efficiently between departments. Others noted that wildfire responsibilities are often passed around depending on political priorities or funding availability.
Government changes have added to the uncertainty. Responsibility for the Fire and Rescue Service has shifted between departments twice in the past decade, most recently moving to the Ministry of Housing, Levelling Up and Communities in April 2025.
The result, according to Irwin’s research, is a governance system that reacts to crises after the fact, rather than preventing them through joined-up planning.
Fire and Rescue Services: Stretched and Underequipped
Every Fire and Rescue Service in England is legally responsible for responding to wildfires under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, but few are properly equipped to deal with large-scale moorland fires.
During the 2018 Saddleworth Moor fire, over 150 firefighters and 30 engines were deployed, many lacking the correct personal protective equipment (PPE) or wildfire training.
In Dorset and Wiltshire (2025), 46 out of 50 fire stations were actively recruiting firefighters during wildfire season, demonstrating the strain on personnel.
In London, 16 firefighters were injured tackling the 2022 blazes - two hospitalised - in what was described as “the tip of the iceberg.”
Funding is a central issue. The Fire Brigades Union has repeatedly warned of budget cuts - including £1.6 million proposed reductions in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight alone.
Training also varies widely between regions. Only a handful of services have dedicated Wildfire Tactical Advisors, the specialist officers who coordinate complex incidents.
Irwin’s participants said that many services “do the best they can with what they have,” but admitted that a large-scale wildfire could quickly overwhelm local capacity without cross-border assistance.
Landowners: On the Front Line but Often Overlooked
Landowners and moorland managers play a crucial preventive role, but Irwin’s study found that their expertise is often undervalued or excluded from official wildfire planning.
Participants noted that keepers and estate staff possess:
detailed local knowledge of terrain and fuel load,
access to off-road vehicles and water sources,
experience of working in remote and hazardous conditions.
However, these capabilities are rarely integrated into formal command structures during emergencies.
The research also highlights a divide between policy and practice. While Defra promotes rewilding and restrictions on burning, land managers argue that such top-down approaches ignore practical fire prevention realities.
As one participant summarised:
“It’s a land management problem as much as it is a firefighting one.”
The controversy around controlled burning illustrates this divide. Long used as a tool to manage vegetation and reduce fuel load, the practice is now heavily politicised. Yet, as Irwin notes, other countries - including Australia and the US - are increasingly reintroducing cultural and prescribed burning as part of modern wildfire strategy.
Knowledge Gaps and Public Perception
Irwin’s research found widespread concern about poor public awareness of wildfire risks. Many people still assume the UK is “too wet” for wildfires or view them as freak events confined to remote areas.
This lack of awareness leads to risky behaviour - from disposable barbecues to littered cigarettes - which are now among the leading ignition causes.
Participants also criticised the limited production of academic research in the UK. Funding cuts for PhD and wildfire-related research were blamed for the slow growth of knowledge in this field. As one participant put it:
“We’re still learning from papers written a decade ago - and we’re repeating the same mistakes.”
Without clear data and consistent education, public understanding of wildfire risk remains weak, and policy decisions risk being made on outdated or incomplete evidence.
What Needs to Change
Irwin’s findings point to several key areas for reform:
Systemic Governance Change
A national wildfire framework is needed to bring together all responsible departments - from Defra to the Home Office - under one coordinated strategy. Participants called for a dedicated UK Wildfire Agency or at least a permanent interdepartmental group to lead policy, training and funding.
Stable, Long-Term Funding
Short-term or emergency-based budgets make it impossible for Fire and Rescue Services to plan effectively. Consistent funding would allow for equipment upgrades, proper PPE, and regular wildfire-specific training.
Education, Training and Knowledge Exchange
Participants emphasised the value of shared learning between FRS, landowners, academics and local communities. The England and Wales Wildfire Forum (EWWF) was praised as a model for collaboration but said to need greater national backing.
Learning from Past Incidents
Each major wildfire should be followed by a transparent review - similar to an aviation-style investigation - identifying what worked, what failed, and how lessons can be applied nationwide.
Beyond Firefighting: Building True Resilience
Ultimately, the dissertation argues that Britain must move from a reactive to a proactive approach. At present, wildfire response is treated as a one-off emergency rather than an inevitable and recurring environmental hazard.
Participants stressed the need for wildfire to be embedded into wider climate resilience and land management policy - including habitat restoration, grazing, and controlled fuel management.
Without such integration, Irwin warns, the UK will remain trapped in a cycle of “learning the same lessons every year.”
Takeaway
Daisy Irwin’s research paints a clear picture: the UK’s wildfire system is complex, under-coordinated and ill-prepared for the scale of the challenge ahead. While individual efforts - from fire services, land managers and local communities - are strong, the absence of national leadership and consistent funding leaves the country vulnerable.
Her findings reinforce what many moorland managers already know: effective wildfire management depends on cooperation, local knowledge and long-term stewardship of the land.
If wildfire resilience is to improve, the UK must unite its fragmented approach - empowering fire services, landowners and policymakers to work together before the next fire season begins.
