When Applications Are Never Made: What SPA Gamebird Releasing Licences Tell Us About Upland Regulation

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Quick summary

Natural England received 37 applications for SPA gamebird releasing licences in 2026 and granted 20.
Most licences were for the North York Moors SPA, covering 90% of pheasants and 99% of partridges.
No one applied where a 1 October delayed release was likely, so refusal figures miss deterred activity.
The MA wants members' examples of applications not made for gamebirds, heather burning or CRoW restrictions

Natural England has circulated an autumn update to stakeholders on how its SPA gamebird releasing arrangements operated during 2026. That has direct relevance to some Moorland Association members with pheasant or partridge releases on or close to protected sites, including moor-edge shoots and mixed sporting estates.

But it also illustrates a much wider issue for upland regulation. Whether the regime concerns gamebird releasing, heather-burning licences or applications for temporary access restrictions during periods of serious wildfire risk, Government normally sees only the applications which land managers actually submit.

It may see much less of the activity that is changed, delayed, relocated or abandoned because the anticipated regulatory process or conditions make an application impractical. Natural England's latest figures provide a useful real-world example of that problem.

What happened in 2026?

Natural England says that it received 37 applications during 2026 for individual licences to release gamebirds on protected sites in England. Of those, 20 resulted in licences being granted. The geographical concentration is striking.

Natural England reports that 65% of the licences granted were for sites on, or near, the North York Moors SPA. Those licences accounted for 90% of all common pheasants and 99% of all red-legged partridges licensed for release on SPAs in England during 2026.

For some MA members, particularly those operating mixed sporting estates or releases around the edge of the moor, that has immediate practical relevance. It also demonstrates how concentrated the operation of this particular licensing regime has been.

Regulation should respond when the evidence changes

There is a positive lesson in Natural England's update. Following consistently low levels of avian influenza in wild birds from June, Natural England reconsidered licences which had contained a condition preventing release before 1 September. Modified licences removing that condition were issued in early August.

Natural England's published guidance was also updated to reflect that change in risk, moving a number of SPAs, including the North York Moors, Peak District Moors and South Pennine Moors Phase 2, into the category where applications were likely to succeed with standard mitigation.

Where regulation is genuinely risk-based, restrictions should be capable of changing when the evidence changes.

That is an important feature of proportionate regulation and one which should apply much more widely.

What about the applications that were never made?

Perhaps the most interesting part of Natural England's stakeholder update concerns sites where licences were expected to require a delayed release date of 1 October.

Natural England records that one exceptional licence was issued on Salisbury Plain SPA, allowing up to 50 pheasants to be released from 1 October. It then says that no applications were received for SPAs where applications were likely to succeed subject to a 1 October delayed-release condition.

Natural England does not say why no applications were received. It would be wrong to assume that the licensing condition was the explanation in every case but Natural England's own published guidance provides important context.

Before somebody applies, Natural England publishes the licensing outcome it considers likely for each SPA. Applicants are advised to make suitable adjustments to their “business arrangements” according to that likely outcome, and the guidance recognises that delayed release dates may not be practical for every gamebird manager. That matters.

A licence that is never applied for cannot appear in the statistics

Imagine an activity for which a licence is theoretically obtainable, but only subject to conditions which make it operationally or economically impractical.

Someone may be deterred from making an application at all.
They may simply change what they do.
They might reduce the activity, relocate it, abandon it altogether or alter the wider business and land-management operation.

None of those decisions necessarily produces a refused licence. Natural England's guidance specifically tells potential applicants to consider the likely licensing outcome before applying and, where possible, to move releases outside the protected site or its 500-metre buffer. So application and refusal figures can only ever tell part of the story.

A licence which is never applied for will never appear in refusal statistics.

MA members will recognise the same problem elsewhere

This is not simply an issue about pheasant and partridge releasing. The same principle potentially applies across a range of upland regulatory regimes. If an estate decides not to pursue a heather-burning licence because the anticipated process, timing or conditions make the proposed management impractical, that decision will not appear as a refused licence.

Similarly, if a land manager decides not to pursue a Section 25 CRoW access restriction during a period of serious wildfire risk because the process is unlikely to provide a useful decision in the time available, the absence of an application does not necessarily demonstrate the absence of need.

In both cases, official statistics could record very few refusals while overlooking an important part of the regulatory effect. The danger is that Government ends up measuring the operation of the administrative system rather than its effect on land management.

Why this matters to the uplands

Defra's current Call for Evidence says that it wants to understand the effectiveness of regulatory and voluntary approaches, the factors affecting their adoption and the positive and negative consequences of gamebird release and shooting.

If future licensing options are considered for the uplands, Government cannot therefore assess their impact simply by asking how many licences are subsequently granted or refused. It must also look for the effects which occur before the application stage.

That is particularly important on moorland, where sporting management can sit alongside habitat management, grazing, predator control, wildfire management, monitoring, employment and private conservation investment. Changing the viability of one activity can therefore change the management of the wider landscape.

Government must consider the counterfactual

This is why the Moorland Association continues to argue that policy assessment must include the counterfactual. It is not sufficient to ask only what risks an activity may create.

The Government must also ask what happens if regulation causes that activity to be reduced, displaced or cease.

What habitat management continues?
What conservation investment is lost or changed?
What happens to employment and skills?
What replaces the existing management model?
And, most importantly, does the resulting environmental outcome actually improve?

These questions matter whether the regulatory mechanism under consideration concerns gamebird releases, heather burning, species management, access restrictions or potentially wider shooting activity.

If regulatory impact is measured only through applications received, licences granted and licences refused, important consequences can remain invisible.

Can MA members help fill the evidence gap?

We would particularly like to hear from members whose estates include pheasant or partridge releasing on or close to designated upland sites, including moor-edge releases and mixed sporting operations.

We are interested in examples where existing or anticipated licensing requirements have caused an estate to decide not to apply, reduce or relocate releases, alter sporting arrangements, incur significant additional costs, or change associated habitat or land-management activity.

But we would also welcome examples from other areas of upland regulation. Have you decided not to make a heather-burning licence application because the likely process, timing or conditions made the proposed management impractical?

Have you decided not to pursue a Section 25 CRoW access restriction during heightened wildfire risk because the process was unlikely to provide a useful decision in time?

Are there other regulatory processes where the practical effect occurred before any formal application was submitted? These experiences matter because they reveal consequences which may never appear in Government's application statistics.

Email us with your examples: info@moorlandassociation.org

Looking ahead

Natural England has told stakeholders that planning for gamebird licensing in 2027 will begin during autumn 2026. Members whose estates may be affected should therefore begin considering their requirements for next season. Natural England's 2026 figures are useful in themselves, but they illustrate a much wider lesson.

To understand the real impact of regulation, Government needs to examine not only the applications regulators receive, but also the decisions land managers make because of the regulatory regime before an application is ever submitted.